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ABSTRACT
Inflation volatility has significantly declined over the last 20 years in the U.S. To find
out why, I follow a structural approach. I estimate a complete New Keynesian model
which imposes cross-equation restrictions on the time series of inflation, the output
gap and the interest rate. I perform counterfactual analysis with the most commonly
used measures of inflation: Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Gross Domestic Product
Deflator (GDPD). While the change in the propagation mechanism of the economy
induced most of the CPI volatility drop, it played a smaller role in the reduction of
GDPD volatility. Our maximum likelihood estimates imply that the most important
factor behind the drop in inflation volatility was the more forward-looking price setting
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Inﬂation and its variability entail large real costs to the economy. Several studies show
that a 10% inﬂation rate can produce losses of around 3% of the real GNP through
saving and investment misallocation or the loss of value of real balances.1 In light of
these ﬁgures, the current era of low inﬂation level and volatility constitutes a major
macroeconomic development. In this paper we attempt to identify the driving forces
which led to the current low inﬂation volatility in the United States.2
The top panel of Figure 1 graphs historical inﬂation series since 1957. They were
calculated with three measures of the price level frequently used by researchers and
policy makers: the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Personal Consumption Expenditures
Deﬂator (PCE) and the GDP Deﬂator (GDPD). The ﬁgure shows the steady increase
of all the inﬂation series since the mid-60s up to the beginning of the 80s. Since then,
inﬂation has been drastically reduced. Current inﬂation hovers at low levels, comparable
to those of the early 60s. One diﬀerence among the series is that during our sample
period, GDPD inﬂation peaks at the end of 1974, after the ﬁrst oil shock, whereas the
CPI and PCE inﬂation rates reach their maximum values in the beginning of the 80s. The
bottom panel of Figure 1 graphs a 20 quarter rolling standard deviation of each inﬂation
measure. It also shows an important increase since the mid 60s followed by a steady
decline starting in the early 80s. Table 1 lists the sample statistics of the inﬂation series
for diﬀerent sample periods. All the series have experienced a large drop in averages and
volatilities since the end of 1980. While the three measures of inﬂation exhibit smaller
ﬁrst order autocorrelations during the second period, this decline is less pronounced in the
case of the GDPD. Table 1 shows that these empirical facts are reinforced if we remove
the observations included in the high inﬂation volatility period which goes from 1978 to
1983. The overall picture of lower volatility which emerges from Table 1 and Figure 1
motivates the central question in this paper: What led to a lower inﬂation variability?
The approach followed in this paper to answer this question is based upon two build-
ing blocks. First, we formulate a monetary New Keynesian model of the macroeconomy
which comprises aggregate supply, aggregate demand and monetary policy rule equa-
1See, for instance, Fischer (1981), Feldstein (1997) or Lucas (2000).
2While the present paper focuses on the drop of inﬂation volatility, our results also apply to the
reduction in the level of inﬂation. A robust positive relation between the level and the variance of
inﬂation has been long documented in the literature: Okun (1971), Friedman (1977) or Taylor (1981).
1tions with endogenous persistence. In this model higher rates of inﬂation trigger the
response of the monetary authority which raises interest rates. Changes in the real rate,
in turn, reduce the welfare of the representative agent. The introduction of a model has
the advantage that it allows us to identify speciﬁc propagation mechanisms of structural
shocks. The New-Keynesian model seems adequate for our exercise, as it implies macroe-
conomic dynamics which represent a good approximation to those observed in the data,
as shown by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and others. In fact, our model estimates
yield standard deviations and autocorrelation patterns which are broadly consistent with
those found in the data.
Second, we develop a counterfactual analysis in order to determine the driving forces
behind the current low inﬂation environment. This methodology is particularly useful for
our task, as it makes the private agents and the monetary authority confront shocks of
diﬀerent sample periods. Hence, it reveals the counterfactual inﬂation volatilities which
would have arisen under diﬀerent combinations of macroeconomic conditions (shocks)
and private sector/monetary policy behavior. In this way, we can determine what factors
were instrumental in the reduction of inﬂation volatility.
Our counterfactual analysis also assumes that there is a sudden shift in the structural
model parameters and that both the private sector and the monetary authority recognize
it immediately. This is a limitation of our framework, since shifts which agents perceived
with probability zero just before the break are perfectly understood right after. However,
we think that our approach can be seen a ﬁrst order approximation to what happened
in reality, where agents assign probabilities to parameter changes. Additionally, in order
to check for the robustness of our results, we perform a sensitivity analysis around the
estimated parameter values.
We impose the model’s implied cross-equation constraints in estimation and perform
alternative estimations with the three inﬂation measures: CPI and GDPD inﬂation. We
ﬁnd that while CPI inﬂation volatility fell because the internal propagation mechanism
changed, the lower shocks had a large impact on the decline of GDPD inﬂation. We show
some evidence pointing to the prices of investment goods, specially those of equipment,
as responsible for this diﬀerences.
Our maximum likelihood estimates imply that the change towards the more forward-
looking price setting of the 80s and 90s was the most inﬂuential factor in the change of
2the propagation mechanism. We ﬁnd that the shift towards a more aggressive monetary
policy rule of the last two decades also mattered, but to a lesser extent. One implication
of our study is the need to understand better the sources of changes in the price setting. It
could be that the “forward-lookingness” of the price-setting process is related to monetary
policy, but the New-Keynesian model is, in principle, silent about it.
The literature on the drop of inﬂation volatility is quite recent. Boivin and Giannoni
(2002) and Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) use a VAR approach to determine whether
the decrease of inﬂation volatility over the last 20 years was due to smaller shocks or
to changes in the overall transmission mechanism of these exogenous disturbances. The
structural approach followed in this paper allows us to determine the origin of the changes
in the transmission mechanism. Unlike a less structured approach, we can determine
whether variations in the propagation mechanism were due to a change in the conduct
of monetary policy or to parameters describing the structure of the economy. We also
perform a more comprehensive analysis of the drop of inﬂation volatility, as we look at
both CPI and GDPD.
Our paper is also related to the literature on parameter stability of structural macro
models. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003) detected a
signiﬁcant increase in the response of the Fed to inﬂation after Volcker’s arrival. Addi-
tionally, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) ﬁnd parameter instability in their identiﬁed VARs,
whereas Ireland (2001) ﬁnds parameter instability in a structural New-Keynesian macro
model. In this paper we explore whether, and which, changes in structural parameters
triggered the decline of inﬂation volatility.
Two closely related papers are Stock and Watson (2002) and Cogley and Sargent
(2002). The ﬁrst paper uses a structural approach similar to the one employed in this
paper, but its goal is to uncover the factors behind the decline of output volatility. In
contrast to their study, we let all of the structural parameters vary across periods and
not just those in the policy rule. This diﬀerence turns out to be critical in our case,
as we detect a signiﬁcant change in the forward-looking parameter of the AS equation.
Finally, Cogley and Sargent (2002) estimate a time-varying parameter model and ﬁnd
a clear inverse relation between the persistence of CPI inﬂation and the Fed’s degree of
responsiveness to inﬂation. While our model estimates also capture this contemporaneous
relation, we show that other factors, such as the forward-looking price setting of the 80s
and 90s, may have also been inﬂuential.
3This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model of the economy. Section
3 discusses the Rational Expectations solution associated with the model. Section 4
describes the data and the estimation procedure. In Section 5 we perform the break date
tests in order to identify two separate subsamples. In Section 6 we show our main results.
Section 7 concludes.
2 A Macro Model for the U.S. Economy
This section lays out a simple linear Rational Expectations model of the macroecon-
omy which is similar to the ones employed in recent studies of monetary policy such as
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). The model comprises aggregate supply (AS), aggregate
demand (IS) and monetary policy equations. The derivations of each of the equations
are consigned to the Appendix.
The aggregate supply equation is a generalization of the supply speciﬁcation originally
developed by Calvo (1983):
πt = δEtπt+1 + (1 − δ)πt−1 + λyt + εASt (1)
πt is inﬂation between t−1 and t and yt stands for the output gap between t−1 and t. εASt
is the aggregate supply structural shock, assumed to be independently and identically
distributed with homoskedastic variance σ2
AS. It can be interpreted as a cost push shock
which makes real wages deviate from their equilibrium value or simply as a pricing error.
Et is the Rational Expectations operator conditional on the information set at time t,
which comprises πt, yt, rt (the nominal interest rate at time t) and all the lags of these
variables. Equation (1) shows that δ grows as the private sector puts more weight on
expected inﬂation. A virtue of this pricing speciﬁcation is that it captures the empirical
properties of U.S. inﬂation dynamics quite accurately. As the Appendix makes clear,
the endogenous persistence arises due to the existence of price setters who do not adjust
optimally and index their prices with respect to past inﬂation.
The IS or demand equation is based on representative agent intertemporal utility
4maximization with external habit persistence, as proposed by Fuhrer (2000) :
yt = µEtyt+1 + (1 − µ)yt−1 − φ(rt − Etπt+1) + εIS,t (2)
where εISt is the IS shock, assumed to be independently and identically distributed with
homoskedastic variance σ2
IS. In our speciﬁcation, it is the habit formation speciﬁcation
in the utility function which imparts endogenous persistence to the output gap. The
monetary policy channel in the IS equation is captured by the contemporaneous output
gap dependence on the ex ante real rate of interest. This relation arises in standard
Euler equations derived by lifetime utility maximization. The monetary transmission
mechanism depends negatively on the curvature parameter in the utility function, σ and,
for σ > 1, on the parameter that indexes habit persistence, h, since φ = 1
σ(1+h)−h. σ
represents the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in the absence of habit formation.
Appendix A.1 shows that εISt is proportional to the utility function disturbances.
We close the model with the monetary policy rule formulated by Clarida, Gal´ ı, and
Gertler (2000):
rt = αMP + ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[βEtπt+1 + γyt] + εMPt (3)
αMP is a constant and εMPt is the monetary policy shock, assumed to be independently
and identically distributed with homoskedastic variance σ2
MP. The policy rule has two
well diﬀerentiated parts. On the one hand, the monetary authority smooths interest
rates, placing a weight of ρ on the past interest rate. On the other hand, it reacts to high
expected inﬂation and to deviations of output from its trend. The parameter β measures
the long run response of the Central Bank to expected inﬂation, whereas γ describes
its reaction to output gap ﬂuctuations. We assume that the Federal funds rate is the
monetary policy instrument, as much of the previous literature does.
53 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
3.1 Model Equilibrium and Implications
In this section we follow the framework laid out in Cho and Moreno (2002) to derive the
Rational Expectations equilibrium of the model. Our macroeconomic system of equations
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In more compact notation:
B11Xt = α + A11EtXt+1 + B12Xt−1 + εt, εt ∼ (0,D) (4)
where Xt = (πt yt rt)0, B11,A11 and B12 are the coeﬃcient matrices of structural pa-
rameters, and α is a vector of constants. εt is the vector of structural errors, D is the
diagonal structural error variance matrix and 0 denotes a 3×1 vector of zeros. Following
a standard Undetermined Coeﬃcients approach, the Rational Expectations equilibrium
to the system in (4) can be written as the following reduced-form:
Xt+1 = c + ΩXt + Γεt+1 (5)
where c is a 3×1 vector of constants and Ω and Γ are 3×3 matrices. To see this, substitute
equation (5) into equation (4) and rearrange by applying Rational Expectations. Then:
(B11 − A11Ω)Xt = α + A11c + B12Xt−1 + εt (6)
Since the three structural equations are linearly independent, (B11−A11Ω) is nonsingular.
Then, pre-multiplying by (B11−A11Ω)−1 on both sides in equation (6) and matching the
6coeﬃcient matrices of Xt−1 and εt, we obtain:
Ω = (B11 − A11Ω)
−1B12 (7)
Γ = (B11 − A11Ω)
−1 (8)
c = (B11 − A11Ω − A11)
−1α (9)
Therefore, equation (5) with Ω, Γ and c satisfying equations (7), (8) and (9) is a solution
to equation (4). Once we solve for Ω as a function of A11, B11 and B12, Γ and c can be
easily calculated. Notice that the implied reduced-form of our structural model is simply
a VAR of order 1 with highly nonlinear parameter restrictions. There is a linear relation
between the structural errors, εt and the reduced-form Rational Expectations errors (vt),
through Γ,
vt = Γεt (10)
The Rational Expectations equilibrium also yields a simple linear relation between Ω and
Γ through B12, which captures the dependence of the system on the lagged predetermined
variables:
Ω = ΓB12 (11)
3.2 Characterization of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We will utilize two methods in order to determine the Rational Expectations equilibrium
to our system. First, we will use the generalized Schur matrix decomposition method
(QZ) developed by Klein (2000) and outlined by McCallum (1999) in order to obtain
the Rational Expectations equilibrium. The QZ method yields a solution even when
the matrix A11 is singular, which is the case in our model. Appendix B.1 describes the
derivation of the Rational Expectations Solution through the QZ method.
For Ω satisfying (4) to be admissible as a solution, it must be real-valued and exhibit
stationary dynamics. Because Ω is a nonlinear function of the structural parameters
in B11,A11 and B12, there could potentially be multiple equilibria. In this case, the
QZ method does not give us additional information to select one solution. When in-
determinacy of equilibrium arises, we employ the recursive method developed by Cho
and Moreno (2002). They solve the model forward recursively and propose a selection
criterion which is stationary and real-valued by construction. The recursive method is de-
7scribed in Appendix B.2. In it, agents coordinate in an equilibrium which yields a unique
vector of self-fulﬁlling expectations. This equilibrium imposes a transversality condition
that distant future expectations converge to their long run mean. The remaining expec-
tations are discarded, since agents deem them incapable of being satisﬁed.3 Hence, we
will use the QZ and recursive methods jointly in order to determine the solution to our
macroeconomic system.
4 Data and Estimation
We use quarterly data which spans the period between the second quarter of 1957 and
the ﬁrst quarter of 2001. We present estimates with two measures of inﬂation: CPI
and GDPD. The results obtained using PCE inﬂation were very similar to those under
CPI inﬂation. The Federal funds rate is the monetary policy instrument. Our results
are similar using the 3 month T-Bill rate. We use output detrended quadratically. The
results are robust to the use of a linear trend or the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The data
is annualized and in percentages. CPI and Federal funds rate data were obtained from
Datastream, and both the real GDP and GDPD inﬂation were obtained from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
We estimate the structural parameters using Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) by assuming normality of the structural errors. Our FIML estimation procedure
allows us to obtain the structural parameters and the VAR reduced-form in one stage,
aﬀording a higher eﬃciency than two-stage instrumental variables techniques. It seems
adequate to estimate the whole model jointly, given the simultaneity between the private
sector and the Central Bank behavior, as explained by Leeper and Zha (2000).
The log likelihood function can be written as:












( ¯ Xt − Ω ¯ Xt−1)
0Σ
−1( ¯ Xt − Ω ¯ Xt−1)]
(12)
3If the solution falls into the indeterminacy region, the recursive method ignores the possibility of the
sunspot shocks discussed in Farmer and Guo (1994). In the case of indeterminacy, our equilibrium can be
seen as a sunspot equilibrium without sunspots. As it will be shown below, we obtain multiple equilibria
in the ﬁrst subsample. Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) allow for sunspot shocks in their estimation and
cannot reject the existence of a sunspot equilibrium without sunspots in the pre-Volcker period.
8where ¯ Xt = Xt − EXt, θ = (δ,λ,µ,φ,ρ,β,γ,σ2
AS,σ2
IS,σ2
MP) and Σ = ΓDΓ0. EXt is the
unconditional expectation of Xt.
The matrices Ω and Γ can be calculated by the QZ method or the recursive method.
We maximize the likelihood function with respect to the structural parameters in θ, not
the reduced-form ones in Ω or Γ. Given the structural parameters, the matrices Ω and Γ
must be calculated at each iteration. This requires checking whether there is a unique,
real-valued stationary solution at each iteration. Whenever there are multiple solutions
at the i-th iteration, we apply the recursive method to select one solution. We choose the
initial parameters from the values used in the literature. In order to check for robustness
of our estimates we set up diﬀerent initial conditions, randomizing around the obtained
parameter estimates ﬁve times. In all of the cases convergence to the same parameter
estimates was attained. We also found that the estimates obtained through our recursive
method converge to the c, Ω and Γ matrices obtained through the QZ method.
5 Dating the Structural Break in the U.S. Economy
Since our strategy consists of accounting for the drop of inﬂation volatility by the changes
in shocks and in propagation, we need to identify two separate subsamples. To this end,
we perform a structural break date test, which detects the most likely break date of
all the coeﬃcients of an unrestricted VAR over the whole sample period. The idea is
that variations in these coeﬃcients reﬂect changes in the parameters of our underlying
structural model. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) and Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler
(1999), among others, have shown evidence of parameter instability across diﬀerent sam-
ple periods.
We use the Sup-Wald test derived by Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998), which detects
the most likely structural break date in the reduced-form coeﬃcients of a vector autore-
gression. Our motivation for the use of this test is twofold. First, breaks in reduced-form
coeﬃcients must come from shifts in structural parameters. In order to respond to the
Lucas critique, we need then to split the full sample at the time of the structural break
in vector autoregressive coeﬃcients. Second, there is evidence of a change in the uncon-
strained VAR coeﬃcients which is responsible for the decrease in the overall inﬂation
volatility over the last 20 years (see Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) and section 6.3
9below). In this respect it seems then adequate to focus on breaks in all the unconstrained
parameters.
Table 2 reports the Sup-Wald test associated with unconstrained VARs of orders
one to ﬁve using the CPI inﬂation rate. Except for the VAR(1), the beginning of the
4th quarter of 1980 is identiﬁed as the most likely break date for the parameters of the
reduced-form relation (in the case of the VAR(1), the break date selected is the third
quarter of 1980). Since the Schwarz criterion selects the VAR(3) as the order which
provides the best ﬁt to the data, we set the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1980, one
year after Paul Volcker became Federal Reserve chairman, as our break date. Figure 2
graphs the time series of the Wald statistics for the VAR(3). This break date is robust
across inﬂation and output gap measures and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The 90%
conﬁdence interval is very tight, including only three quarters. This date coincides with
the largest increase, between two quarters, in the average Federal funds rate during the
whole sample: From 9.83% in the 3rd quarter of 1980 to 15.85% on the 4th.
While there appears to be a clear break date in the relation among our three macroe-
conomic variables, it seems plausible that more than one structural break has occurred
in the joint ﬂuctuations of inﬂation, the output gap and the Federal funds rate over the
complete sample period. Stock and Watson (2002), for instance, perform a battery of
univariate and multivariate tests and conclude that the most likely break date test for the
majority of the macroeconomic series is around 1984.4 In order to gauge the robustness of
our break date, we perform the following experiment: We estimate unconstrained VARs
for the two subsamples separated by the original break date. Then, with the residuals
of these vector autoregressions, we run the Sup-Wald test for both samples. If no other
clear structural break dates existed, no obvious break dates should arise in this exercise,
since the sample splitting would make the unconstrained parameters approximately sta-
ble across samples. Table 3 shows the break date statistics for unconstrained VARs for
the two subsamples and Figure 3 graphs the time series of Wald statistics.5 While the
years 1974 and 1986 appear as candidates for break dates across subsamples, these breaks
4One major diﬀerence, however, is that when testing for an unknown break date in a multivariate
framework, they restrict their attention to the break in the mean of the GDP growth. Accordingly, they
perform the Sup-Wald test on VARs with diﬀerent components of the GDP, but do not include inﬂation
or the Federal funds rate. Additionally, in our case, we let all the VAR coeﬃcients break whereas they
focus on breaks in the unconditional variances.
5Note that we trim the initial and ﬁnal 15% of the sample when running the Sup-Wald test. As
Maddala and Kim (1998) point out, it is customary to do so in order to rule out breaks around the ends.
10are not as clear as in the original case, since the exact quarter diﬀers for each VAR order.
Given this ﬁnding and the fact that two relatively large subsamples will be available for
estimation, we will proceed with our analysis assuming that there was a single structural
break on the 4th quarter of 1980.
6 Results
In this section we present our main ﬁndings. First, we report the U.S. FIML baseline pa-
rameter estimates for both inﬂation speciﬁcations and we perform a parameter stability
study. Second, we analyze the properties of the implied Rational Expectations equilib-
rium and the model’s goodness of ﬁt. Then we proceed to explain the inﬂuence of the
diﬀerent propagation mechanisms (monetary policy and remaining model’s parameters)
on the decline of inﬂation volatility.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
6.1.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 4 reports the U.S. FIML estimates with both inﬂation measures. In order to
accommodate the documented change in the deterministic trend growth of output (see,
for instance, Orphanides and Porter (1998)) we allow for separate quadratic trends across
subsamples, just as in Ireland (2001).
The estimates in Table 4 have all the right sign across speciﬁcations and most of
them are statistically signiﬁcant. In the AS equation, agents put more weight on ex-
pected inﬂation than on past inﬂation in both periods, whereas in the IS equation they
put around the same weight on the expected and past output gap across periods. The
coeﬃcient on the real rate in the IS equation, φ, and the Phillips curve parameter, λ are
however imprecisely estimated. Estrella and Fuhrer (1999), Smets (2000), Kim (2000)
and Ireland (2001) also obtained small and insigniﬁcant estimates for these two param-
eters. Nelson and Nikolov (2002) show that Bayesian and Minimum Distance methods
yield larger values estimates of φ than those obtained through Maximum Likelihood or
Instrumental Variables estimators.
11The estimates of the monetary policy reaction function reﬂect the smoothing behavior
of the Fed, as the persistence coeﬃcient, ρ, is of large magnitude. They also show that
the Fed reacted more strongly to future inﬂation in the second period, although not
signiﬁcantly so, and that it acted in a countercyclical fashion, as γ has positive signs in
all cases. It is interesting to note that γ is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst period across inﬂation
speciﬁcations, but in the second period it only becomes signiﬁcant under the GDPD
speciﬁcation.
Three major stylized facts emerge from Table 4 across speciﬁcations. First, the three
standard deviations of the structural shocks are lower in the second period, especially
the one corresponding to the IS shock. Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Ahmed, Levin,
and Wilson (2002) report decreases in their output equation innovations of a very similar
magnitude. Cogley and Sargent (2002) also report a 40% decrease of the variance of the
shock in their unemployment equation. Stock and Watson (2002) also present evidence
that structural shocks have been milder since 1984. Second, the probability distribution
of the Fed’s reaction to expected inﬂation shifted to the right in the second period,
but the diﬀerence across estimates is not statistically signiﬁcant. In this respect, the
evidence is mixed across studies. On the one hand, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), with
single equation GMM estimation and both Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) and Cogley and
Sargent (2002), with a Bayesian MLE approach in a system framework, ﬁnd signiﬁcant
increases in the Fed reaction to inﬂation. On the other hand, Sims (1999) and Sims
and Zha (2002), with regime switching models and both Ireland (2001) and Cho and
Moreno (2002), through frequentist MLE in a system framework, do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
increase.6 Third, private agents put more weight on expected inﬂation in the AS equation
during the second period. This is more pronounced in the estimation with CPI inﬂation.
Less attention has been paid to this third fact, however. The exception is Boivin and
Giannoni (2003), who also report an increase in this parameter.
As a robustness check, we exclude the ﬁrst 4 observations of the second sample and
estimate the model parameters. As Table 4 shows, the stylized facts mentioned above do
not change. In fact, none of the results reported below is altered if we exclude the initial
observations of the second sample.
6Cho and Moreno (2002) further show in their small sample analysis that β is upwardly biased.
126.1.2 Structural Estimates in the AS and IS equations
So far we have presented the results for the baseline estimates. The appendix shows
however that the four baseline parameters of the AS and IS equations (δ, λ, µ and φ)
are a function of ﬁve deeper structural parameters (ϑ, ϕ, ψ, σ and h). As can be seen,
without further restrictions, we cannot uniquely identify the structural parameters. Our
strategy is then to restrict ψ = 1 so that the remaining parameters can be identiﬁed.
The associated standard errors can be computed through the delta-method.
Table 5 presents the structural parameter estimates. As the appendix shows, the
price-setters who do not adjust optimally, index their prices with respect to past inﬂation.
They implement the following indexation rule: log Pt =logPt−1 + ϑπt−1. As a result, ϑ
reﬂects the degree of indexation with respect to past inﬂation. Our CPI estimates imply
that ϑ was 0.82 in the ﬁrst period, and 0.69 in the second, whereas the GDPD imply 0.86
in the ﬁrst period, and 0.79 in the second. Our estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and
consistent with the implied upper bound of 0.5 for the backward looking term.7 These
estimates are similar to those found by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999). They reﬂect less indexing
with respect to past inﬂation on the side of price-setters. ϕ reﬂects the probability of not
adjusting prices optimally on a given period. It is estimated to be around 0.95, but not
signiﬁcantly in most of the cases.
The implied estimates of the curvature parameter in the utility function, σ, are be-
tween 35 and 112, but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero across periods or inﬂation
measures. Finally, the habit persistence parameter, h, is around 1 and statistically sig-
niﬁcant across inﬂation measures and sample periods. Fuhrer (2000) found it to be 0.80.
6.1.3 Parameter Stability Tests
Table 7 presents the Wald tests for parameter stability of the baseline parameters. It
shows that at the 5% level, in the case of the estimates with CPI inﬂation, two parameters
reject the null of stability: δ, the forward-looking parameter in the AS equation and σIS,
the structural IS or demand shock. Precisely these two parameters will be crucial in
lowering inﬂation and output gap volatility, respectively. Interestingly, in their time
7Notice however that this analysis understates the true standard errors, as we calibrate the subjective
discount factor.
13varying parameter model, Cogley and Sargent (2002) fail to reject the time invariance
hypothesis in the inﬂation equation, which is the only equation where they detect a
reasonably high power in their sup-Wald test. In the context of our model, the move
towards a more forward-looking price setting seems to be instrumental in producing
instability of reduced-form parameters.8
In the case of the GDPD estimation, δ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across periods,
but σAS and, marginally, γ, are. We will show that the decline of the AS shocks in the
second period triggered the lower GDPD inﬂation volatility in the second period.
Table 8 shows that, out of the structural parameter estimates in the AS and IS
equation, only the ϑ in the CPI speciﬁcation rejects the null of stability. Of course, this
has to do with the signiﬁcative diﬀerence of δ across periods.
6.2 Model’s Implied Equilibrium and Goodness of Fit
Table 6 reports the generalized eigenvalues associated with the Rational Expectations
equilibrium in both subsamples for the three data speciﬁcations. Whereas the second
period equilibrium is unique in all cases, the ﬁrst period estimates give rise to multiple
equilibria, as there are more than three eigenvalues less than unity. Under Ricardian
ﬁscal policy, multiple equilibria can arise due to the violation of the “Taylor principle”,
whereby the Fed does not stabilize inﬂation ﬂuctuations (β < 1). Then, for the ﬁrst
subsample, we select the solution implied by the recursive method, which selects the
equilibrium associated with the three smallest eigenvalues.
Table 9 compares, across sample periods, the volatilities of the variables found in the
data with their model’s counterparts. Since the structural model is nested in a VAR(1)
system, all the elements of the implied variance-covariance matrix of the model (V(Xt))
can be easily computed from the Rational Expectations model solution in (5) as:
vec(V(Xt)) = (I − Ω ⊗ Ω)
−1(Γ ⊗ Γ)vec(D) (13)
where I is the identity matrix of dimension 9 × 9, ⊗ is the Kronecker product operator
and vec represents an operator stacking the columns of a matrix. All the volatilities are
8Alternatively, Rudebusch (2003) presents a careful statistical exercise showing that shifts in policy
rules by themselves have a small impact on the unconstrained VAR coeﬃcients.
14matched with precision except in the case of the second period interest rate volatility.
This seems to be due to the highly non-linear behavior of the Federal funds rate during
the beginning of the 80s under the Volcker disinﬂation. Cogley and Sargent (2002) show
however that the inclusion stochastic volatility in their time-varying parameter model
does not aﬀect the model’s estimates appreciably.
Figure 4 compares the sample autocorrelation functions with those implied by our
structural model under the CPI inﬂation speciﬁcation. Very similar results were ob-
tained using GDPD inﬂation. In both periods, the sample autocorrelation functions
of inﬂation fall within the model’s conﬁdence bands except for distant autocorrelations
in the ﬁrst period. The model’s output gap autocorrelation seems to overpredict its
sample counterpart in both periods. Finally, the model matches the interest rate auto-
correlation function across sample periods quite closely. The cross-correlations are not as
precisely matched as the autocorrelations. This seems to be due to the fact that two im-
portant parameters which capture cross-coeﬃcients feedback (φ and λ) are not precisely
estimated.
We now compare the propagation mechanism implied by our model to that of an
unconstrained VAR(1). For ease of exposition, we write our model solution alongside the
VAR(1) in demeaned form:
Xt = ΩXt−1 + ςt (14)
Xt = Ω
olsXt−1 + vt (15)
where ςt = Γεt. Under the null of the model, Ω = Ωols. Figure 5 compares the VAR(1)
and model’s impulse response functions of the macro variables to the three reduced-form
shocks (inﬂation, output gap and interest rate shocks). It shows that the model does
a good job matching the dynamics found in the data along most dimensions for the
two sample periods. The model does not reproduce, however, the increase in inﬂation
following an interest rate shock. This is due to the way monetary policy operates in
our New-Keynesian economy: an increase in the interest rate lowers the output gap and
inﬂation contemporaneously through the IS and Phillips curve relations. The model also
seems to understate the impact of monetary policy on the output gap, especially in the
ﬁrst period. This appears to be related to the small estimate of the coeﬃcient on the
real rate in the IS equation, φ.
15The cross-equation restrictions implied by the model are rejected by a likelihood-ratio
test. This is mainly due to the strong restrictions embedded in the variance-covariance
matrix of the structural errors. Additionally, the model does not reproduce the “price
puzzle”, present in most empirical VARs. However, Cho and Moreno (2002) perform a
small sample study of the likelihood ratio test of this model and ﬁnd that when exogenous
correlation is added to the model, this is only marginally rejected.
6.3 Explaining the Drop in Inﬂation Volatility
In this subsection we attempt to determine the sources of the increased stability in the
inﬂation rate in the context of our New-Keynesian macro model. To this end, we develop
a counterfactual analysis given the parameter estimates obtained across sample periods.
We also develop a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results. We compare
the contribution of both shocks and the model’s propagation mechanism to the decline in
inﬂation volatility. Then, we compare the role of shocks and propagation in the change of
each component of inﬂation volatility: anticipated and unanticipated. Finally we focus
our attention on the speciﬁc roles of monetary policy authority and the private sector.
6.3.1 Shocks or Propagation? What Propagation?
In this section we study the role of exogenous shocks and internal propagation in the doc-
umented inﬂation volatility drop. Table 10 compares the standard deviations of inﬂation
and the output gap for all the sample combinations of structural shocks and propaga-
tion. It performs the analysis for both the empirical VAR(1) and the structural model.
Let Di be the matrix of structural shocks in period i and Φj the matrix of propagation
coeﬃcients of period j. Then, for instance, σk(Di,Φj), where k = π,y,r and i,j = 1,2,
denotes the standard deviation of the variable k implied by the system including the
shocks of sample i and the propagation of sample j. There are 5 possible counterfactual
comparisons which can be carried out:
1. If σk(D1,Φ1) > σk(D1,Φ2), the changes in propagation contribute to a lower volatil-
ity of variable k.
2. If σk(D1,Φ1) > σk(D2,Φ1), the changes in shocks contribute to a lower volatility
16of variable k.
3. If σk(D2,Φ2) < σk(D1,Φ2), the changes in shocks contribute to a lower volatility
of variable k.
4. If σk(D2,Φ2) < σk(D2,Φ1), the changes in propagation contribute to a lower volatil-
ity of variable k.
5. If σk(D1,Φ2) < σk(D2,Φ1), changes in propagation are more important than changes
in shocks in explaining a lower volatility of variable k. To see this, suppose that the
four previous inequalities hold. In that case, both shocks and volatility contributed
to lower volatility. To determine which factor was more inﬂuential, we compare the
volatilities implied by the more stabilizing propagation and the larger shocks with
the destabilizing propagation and the smaller shocks.
Whereas the ﬁrst and second inequalities describe how, given an initial subsample,
changes in propagation or shocks would aﬀect the volatilities, the third and fourth in-
equalities reﬂect the changes in volatilities that would be brought about by returning
to past scenarios of shocks or propagation. The ﬁfth comparison allows us to gauge
the overall importance of shocks relative to propagation in the (relevant) case that both
shocks and propagation contributed to a lower inﬂation variance in a given period.
Table 10 presents the results of the counterfactual exercise.9 It shows that the model
can explain the lower inﬂation volatility of the second period. In the case of the CPI,
the implied second period inﬂation volatilities are statistically smaller in the second
period. A comparison between σπ(D1,Φ1) and σπ(D1,Φ2) for both inﬂation speciﬁcations
reveals that the changes in propagation in the second period contributed to the decline
of inﬂation volatility. This result is conﬁrmed by the fact that σπ(D2,Φ2) < σπ(D2,Φ1).
The lower shocks also contributed to lower inﬂation volatility as σπ(D2,Φ1) < σπ(D1,Φ1)
and σπ(D1,Φ2) > σπ(D2,Φ2).
In the case of the CPI, the change in propagation was more inﬂuential than the decline
of shocks to reduce overall inﬂation volatility, since σπ(D2,Φ1) < σπ(D1,Φ2). As for the
decrease in GDPD inﬂation volatility, the model’s counterfactuals give more importance
to the smaller shocks in the second period than to the changes of propagation. Table
9We developed an analogous counterfactual exercise with an unconstrained VAR(1). The results are
very similar to those yielded by the structural model.
174 reveals two main diﬀerences in the estimates under GDPD inﬂation with respect to
CPI inﬂation: First, the increase in the forward-looking component in the AS equation is
more moderate in the case of the GDPD estimation. Second, the decline in the standard
deviation of the AS shock under GDPD inﬂation is, in percentage terms, larger than
under CPI inﬂation. In the next subsection we examine the sources of diﬀerences across
inﬂation measures.
Table 11 performs a sensitivity analysis to determine the robustness of our ﬁndings
based on the model. The sensitivity analysis is motivated by the fact that the estimates
of the transmission mechanism were imprecisely estimated at very low values. Indeed,
Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) have shown that estimates of the Phillips curve using marginal
costs instead of the output gaps are larger and signiﬁcant. Accordingly, we ﬁx the Phillips
curve parameter value, λ, and the coeﬃcient on the real rate, φ across sample periods at
the average of the estimates and also at larger values. Then we estimate the rest of the
model’s parameters and compare σπ(D2,Φ1) with σπ(D1,Φ2). The results remain intact
for the three inﬂation speciﬁcations.
Our structural model has the advantage that it reveals along what dimensions prop-
agation changed. In order to gauge the inﬂuence of each parameter change in the overall
decrease of inﬂation volatility, Table 12 performs a counterfactual exercise: It calculates
the inﬂation variance which would obtain under the second period estimates of one of
the parameters and the ﬁrst period values of the remaining parameters. Table 12 also
shows It shows that the more aggressive response of the Fed to expected inﬂation in the
second period also contributed to the lower inﬂation volatility. However, for the two
data speciﬁcations, the most inﬂuential individual parameter change was the increase
in the forward-looking component of the price setting. This more ﬂexible price setting
may have been the result of an increased ﬂexibility in indexation schemes of wage and
ﬁnancial contracts. However, we are also open to the possibility that it is related to
monetary policy in some form not speciﬁed by current New-Keynesian models.
Panel B of Table 12 develops an analogous exercise to determine the decline of which
structural shock was more inﬂuential in the decrease of inﬂation volatility. In both cases,
the decline of the AS shock results in a larger decline of volatility. It also shows that in
the GDPD speciﬁcation inﬂation volatility is more sensitive to the decrease in the size of
the AS shocks.
18Table 13 analyzes the inﬂuence of the private sector behavior and the monetary
policy authority on the decline of CPI inﬂation volatility. To this end, it compares the
counterfactual inﬂation volatility under the ﬁrst period private sector parameters (IS
and AS parameters) and the second period monetary policy rule with that under second
period private sector of ﬁrst period polity rule. We perform this analysis with diﬀerent
parameter combinations. First, we use the baseline parameter estimates. Second, we
ﬁxed λ and φ at the two period average and estimated the rest of the parameters. Third,
we ﬁxed λ and φ at values one order of magnitude larger than those found in estimation.
In the three cases the changes in the private sector structural parameters were more
important in the decline of inﬂation volatility than those in the monetary policy rule.
As for the output gap volatility, the reduction that we are explaining in our sample
is fairly small. Nevertheless, the key factor underlying this small output gap volatility
drop is to be found in the smaller shocks, since σy(D2,Φ1) < σy(D1,Φ2) in our two data
speciﬁcations. The changes in propagation did not contribute to this lower volatility,
as σy(D1,Φ1) < σy(D1,Φ2) and σy(D2,Φ1) < σy(D2,Φ2). The decrease in output gap
volatility was mostly induced by the signiﬁcant decrease in the IS shock, which falls sig-
niﬁcantly in the three speciﬁcations. McConnell and Quir´ os (1992) attribute the smaller
output volatility since 1984 to the improvement of inventory management. Such event
would enter in our model in the form of smaller structural shocks, since it does not arise
endogenously in our New-Keynesian setup. This result is consistent with Simon (2000),
Blanchard and Simon (2001), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) and Stock and Watson
(2002) who, with alternative methodologies, also ﬁnd that the key factor behind the drop
of output volatility was the smaller shocks of the 80s and 90s.
6.3.2 Diﬀerences between CPI and GDPD inﬂation rates
In order to gain intuition about the diﬀerent behavior of the GDPD, it can be useful
to summarize the three main diﬀerences among the GDPD and the CPI: First, the CPI
includes the price of imported goods, unlike the GDPD. Second, the GDPD includes the
price of goods purchased by investors, the government, and by foreign buyers of domestic
goods, unlike the CPI. Finally, the CPI is a ﬁxed price index whereas GDPD accounts
for the changes in the domestic production and consumption, respectively. We do not
believe that our ﬁnding is related to diﬀerences in the weights of the indexes, since the
19CPI is a ﬁxed price index but the PCE is not, and we obtained similar results for both.
It seems that divergences in coverage are driving the diﬀerent results. In particular, the
GDPD is the broader index in scope since it includes the prices of goods purchased by
ﬁrms, government, investors and foreign buyers.
Figure 6 graphs all the GDPD inﬂation components, except consumption, against
GDPD inﬂation. It also shows the graph of imports inﬂation. Three features are worth-
while mentioning. First, all of the series move close to GDPD inﬂation except imports.
Second, except for government expenses inﬂation, the remaining series reach their peak
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1974, around the ﬁrst oil shock. This is also the case for GDPD
inﬂation, but not for CPI or PCE inﬂation. Third, there is a sharp decline in the private
domestic investment inﬂation around 1980.
We investigate the second moments of these inﬂation measures in Table 14. We
split the sample according to our estimated subsamples. All of the series experience an
important drop in volatility in the second period. Interestingly, only domestic private
investment has a larger ﬁrst order correlation in the second period. This should explain
why the second period correlation of the GDPD is similar to the ﬁrst one, unlike the CPI
or the PCE.
We further study two components of the ﬁxed investment index (the largest by far
within the private domestic investment category): Structures (ST) and Equipment and
Software (ES). Figure 7 reveals two important details. First, the sharp drop of prices in
the early 80s is much more pronounced in the case of the ST series. On the other hand,
the oil crisis eﬀect produced an unusually large spike in ES. Table 14 presents the second
moments of ST and ES. It shows that the ST series has a much larger correlation in the
ﬁrst period. It also shows that the decline in correlation of ES is smaller than that of
other series such as government expenditures or consumption.10
7 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that the more stabilizing propagation mechanisms of the 80s and
90s played a key role in the decline of CPI inﬂation volatility. The decrease of GDPD
10We are currently estimating the model with the diﬀerent series of inﬂation components. Preliminary
evidence suggests that investment and exports are causing the diﬀerences between CPI and GDPD.
20volatility, however, was more inﬂuenced by the smaller shocks. We also showed that
the leading factor behind the “improved” propagation mechanism was the more forward-
looking price setting of the 80s and 90s. In the context of our New-Keynesian model, we
showed that the shift towards a more aggressive monetary policy also mattered, but to
a lesser extent.
This paper raises a number of questions for future research, but perhaps the most
pressing one is related to the contemporaneous increase in the Fed’s responsiveness to
inﬂation and the private sector’s forward-looking behavior in the AS equation. A more
forward-looking price setting can be rationalized by several factors, such as an increased
ﬂexibility in wage indexation schemes or the development of information technologies
which increases both price competitiveness and ﬂexibility. However, as Woodford (2002)
observes, variations in agents’ price setting behavior are exogenous in standard AS spec-
iﬁcations with endogenous persistence, such as the one employed in this paper. It could
be that the price setting behavior of ﬁrms is directly related to the Fed’s stance against
inﬂation. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), for example, derive a state-dependent pric-
ing speciﬁcation. The present paper underscores the need to model and estimate the
links between the price setting behavior and the monetary authority’s degree of activism
more explicitly.
Another area of future research will be the introduction of monetary aggregates in
the structural model. It is well known (see, for instance, Bernanke and Mihov (1998))
that during some periods the Fed targeted money stocks. If this is the case, standard
Taylor-rule type estimates could be biased by not considering this fact. By introducing
money market clearing we could easily take into account shocks to money demand in the
monetary policy rule by adding the money demand as a new equation. Finally, Leeper
and Roush (2002) show that the monetary transmission mechanism is not conﬁned to
changes in the real rate of interest. Expanding the current demand equation to account
for the inﬂuence of money supply on output seems a worthwhile exercise.
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A A Macro Model for the US Economy
A.1 IS Equation




















The utility function exhibits external habit persistence. ξt is an i.i.d. process which rep-
resents disturbances to the preferences. The optimal intertemporal consumption choice
is then given by the standard Euler equation:
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In the steady state, ξt = 0. We perform a log-linear approximation to (18) and use
the market clearing condition, ˜ yt = Ct to substitute for consumption and obtain the IS











yt = µ1Etyt+1 + µ2yt−1 − φ(rt − Etπt+1) + gt − Etgt+1 (20)












σ(1 + h) − h
(23)
(24)
where h is the habit persistence parameter. Notice that µ1 + µ2 = 1. σ = −
ucc¯ y
uc denotes
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution , ¯ y is the steady state detrended
output and gt =
ucξ
uc(σ(1+h)−h)ξt. All the variables are expressed in percentage deviations





Since ξt is i.i.d. distributed, we ﬁnally
obtain:




For ease of exposition, we ﬁrst present the AS equation derived in the absence of endoge-
nous persistence.
In order to set up an explicit price optimization problem, Calvo (1983) and the subse-
quent literature assume monopolistic competition in the intermediate product markets.
A retail distributor combines the diﬀerentiated output of a continuum of monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms, Yi,t, into a detrended composite product, ˜ yt, with elasticity of





























In the Calvo (1983) pricing framework, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts according to an
arrival rate (1−ϕ). Thus, each ﬁrm resets prices every period with a probability (1−ϕ).
The ﬁrms which do not adjust leave the price unchanged.




















































subject to the budget constraint
R 1
0 Pi,tCi,tdi = I, where I is the agent’s income. Then the market
clearing condition yt = Ct (and Yi,t = Ci,t) is imposed.
















. The ﬁrst order condition





















where µ = θ
θ−1 is the constant markup. Log-linearizing (34) around the steady state and
solving for ˆ pt = log(
P∗
i,t
Pt ), we obtain:








T−t Et [πT] (35)
where ˆ st is the percentage deviation from steady state of the real marginal cost of pro-
ducing yi,t. Subtracting ϕψˆ pt+1 from both sides of the last equation and using (30) yields
a relation describing the inﬂation dynamics:
πt = ψEtπt+1 + λˆ st (36)
where λ =
(1−ϕ)(1−ϕψ)
ϕ . Notice the key role of the nominal rigidities linking the real sector
of the economy with inﬂation. Without a time-varying markup, it can be shown that
in equilibrium there is a proportionality relation between real marginal costs and the
output gap. We then rewrite our AS equation as:
πt = ψEtπt+1 + λyt (37)
To add endogenous persistence, we assume that the price-setters who do not adjust
optimally, index their prices taking into account previous inﬂation. Hence,
logPt = logPt−1 + ϑπt−1 (38)














Solving the model in analogous way to the case without endogenous persistence, you
can obtain the following AS equation:










For a time discount factor arbitrarily close to unity, δ2 ≈ 1 − δ1. In this instance,
the supply speciﬁcation is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis. We also add an
exogenous AS shock to the supply equation which accounts for deviations of real wages
from their equilibrium value or simply pricing errors. Therefore, the supply equation
becomes:
πt = δEtπt+1 + (1 − δ)πt−1 + λyt + ε
AS
t (43)
26A.3 Monetary Policy Rule
The instrument of the monetary authority, the Federal funds rate, is set according to the
following reaction function:
rt = ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)r
∗
t + εMPt (44)
r
∗
t = ¯ r
∗ + β(Etπt+1 − ¯ π) + γyt (45)
¯ π is the long run equilibrium level of inﬂation, ¯ r∗ is the desired nominal interest rate
and εMPt is the monetary policy shock. There are two parts to the equation: The lagged
interest rate captures the well known tendency of the Federal Reserve towards smoothing
interest rates, whereas r∗
t represents the “Taylor rule” whereby the monetary authority
reacts to deviations of expected inﬂation from its target and to deviations of output from
its potential level. Hence, the monetary policy equation becomes:
rt = αMP + ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[βEtπt+1 + γyt] + εMPt (46)
where αMP = (1 − ρ)(¯ r∗ − β¯ π)
B Rational Expectations Equilibrium
B.1 The QZ Method
In this appendix we derive the Rational Expectations solution of our New-Keynesian
model using the generalized (QZ) Decomposition. For ease of exposition we reproduce
equations (4) and (5) in mean deviation, so that ¯ Xt = Xt − EXt:
B11 ¯ Xt = A11Et ¯ Xt+1 + B12 ¯ Xt−1 + t (47)
¯ Xt+1 = Ω ¯ Xt + Γt+1 (48)
We further assume that the error terms are serially correlated, i.e. t = Ft−1 + wt. Our
goal is to solve for Ω and Γ, since they completely determine the equilibrium dynamics
27of our system.
Substituting equation (48) into equation (47) we can obtain
A11[Ω(Ω ¯ Xt−1 + Γt) + ΓFt] = B11[Ω ¯ Xt−1 + Γt] − B12 ¯ Xt−1 − t (49)
Collecting the Xt−1 and t terms yields, respectively:
A11Ω
2 = B11Ω − B12 (50)
A11ΩΓ + A11ΓF = B11Γ − I (51)



























where n is the
number of endogenous variables. Then the generalized Schur decomposition guarantees
the existence of invertible matrices Q and Z such that QAZ = S and QBZ = T, with
S and T triangular. The ratios
tii
sii are the generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil
B − λA, where λ ∈ C is a given generalized eigenvalue. Premultiply (52) by Q, deﬁne























where the submatrices Sij,Hij and Tij are of dimension n × n. The second row can be
written as:
S22(H21Ω + H22)Ω = T22(H21Ω + H22) (54)




28Finally Σ is obtained directly from equation (51):
vec(Σ) = [I + F




B.2 The Recursive Method
We can characterize the stationarity, uniqueness and real-valuedness of the equilibrium
of our system as follows: If all the eigenvalues,
tii
sii, are less than unity in absolute value,
Ω is stationary. If the number of stable generalized eigenvalues is the same as that of the
predetermined variables (3 in our model, the lagged endogenous variables), then there
exists a unique solution. If there are more than 3 stable generalized eigenvalues, we have
multiple solutions. Conversely, if there are less than 3 stable eigenvalues, there is no
stable solution. Finally, Ω is real-valued if (a) each one of its eigenvalues is real-valued,
or (b) for every complex eigenvalue of Ω, the complex conjugate is also an eigenvalue
of Ω. Unfortunately, in the case of multiple stationary solutions, there seems to be no
agreement about the selection of a solution among the candidates.13 In this case, we use
the recursive method developed by Cho and Moreno (2002), who solve the model forward
recursively and propose an alternative simple selection criterion which is bubble-free and
real-valued by construction. The idea is to construct sequences of convergent matrices,
{Ck,Ωk,Γk,k = 1,2,3,...} such that:
¯ Xt = CkEt ¯ Xt+k+1 + Ωk ¯ Xt−1 + Γkεt (57)
We characterize the solution that is fully recursive as follows. We check ﬁrst whether
Ω∗ ≡ lim
k→∞
Ωk and Γ∗ ≡ lim
k→∞
Γk exist, and Ω∗ is the same as one of the solutions obtained
through the QZ method. For the limit to equation (57) to be a bubble-free solution,
lim
k→∞
CkEt ¯ Xt+k+1 must be a zero vector. Then the solution must be of the form:
¯ Xt = Ω
∗ ¯ Xt−1 + Γ
∗εt (58)
Finally, we check whether lim
k→∞
CkEt ¯ Xt+k+1 = lim
k→∞
CkΩ∗k = 0 using equation (58).
13Blanchard and Kahn (1980) suggest the choice of the 3 smallest eigenvalues and McCallum (1999)
suggests the choice that would yield Ω = 0 if it were the case that B12 = 0. Uhlig (1997) observes
that McCallum’s criterion is diﬃcult to implement but it often coincides with Blanchard and Kahn’s
criterion.
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33Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 1980:4Q-2001:1Q 1957:2Q-1977:4Q 1983:1Q-2001:1Q
CPI
¯ π 4.7383 3.5835 3.8939 3.2688
(0.7243) (0.3452) (0.6083) (0.2521)
σπ 3.7771 2.0340 3.0329 1.4445
(0.4687) (0.3754) (0.4248) (0.1817)
ρπ 0.8215 0.5868 0.7444 0.3804
(0.0654) (0.1134) (0.0856) (0.0918)
PCE
¯ π 4.3062 3.2049 3.6724 2.8020
(0.6025) (0.3073) (0.5458) (0.2477)
σπ 3.0452 1.6318 2.6096 1.2286
(0.3491) (0.2650) (0.4219) (0.1250)
ρπ 0.9113 0.7162 0.8672 0.6058
(0.0445) (0.0671) (0.0642) (0.0890)
GDPD
¯ π 4.3584 3.1967 3.8594 2.5841
(0.5601) (0.3812) (0.5481) (0.1972)
σπ 2.7266 1.8127 2.4958 0.8215
(0.5601) (0.3812) (0.3768) (0.0923)
ρπ 0.9983 0.9203 0.9874 0.9484
(0.0360) (0.0332) (0.0507) (0.0389)
This Table shows the descriptive statistics of CPI inﬂation (CPI), PCE inﬂation (PCE) and GDP
Deﬂator inﬂation (GDPD). ¯ π stands for the average, σπ is the standard deviation and ρπ is the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation. These statistics and their respective standard errors (in parentheses) were computed
using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. The weighting matrix is constructed using 3
Newey-West lags. The following system of equations was estimated for each inﬂation measure:
e1t = πt − ¯ π
e2t = (πt − ¯ π)2 − σ2
π
e3t = (πt − ¯ ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ ¯ π) − ρπ(πt−1 − ¯ ¯ π)2
where ¯ ¯ π is the sample mean of inﬂation. e1t,e2t and e3t are the disturbances so that et = {e1t,e2t,e3t}
and E[et] = 0. There are three parameters to be estimated and three orthogonality conditions, so that
the system is exactly identiﬁed.
34Table 2: Sup-Wald Break Date Statistics
Sample Period VAR Sup-Wald Break Date 90% Conﬁdence Interval
1957:2Q-2001:1Q 1 68.35 1980:3Q 1980:2Q-1980:4Q
1957:2Q-2001:1Q 2 115.42 1980:4Q 1980:3Q-1981:1Q
1957:2Q-2001:1Q 3 115.02 1980:4Q 1980:3Q-1981:1Q
1957:2Q-2001:1Q 4 146.70 1980:4Q 1980:3Q-1981:1Q
1957:2Q-2001:1Q 5 163.56 1980:4Q 1980:3Q-1981:1Q
This Table lists the Sup-Wald values of the break date test derived by Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998).
The test detects the most likely break date of a break in all of the parameters of unconstrained VARs
of orders 1 to 5. The Table shows the results of the test using the CPI, quadratically detrended output
gap and the Federal funds rate.
35Table 3: Sup-Wald Break Date Statistics (Robustness Test)
Panel A: 1st subsample
Sample Period VAR Sup-Wald Break Date 90% Conﬁdence Interval
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 1 23.01 1974:4Q 1974:2Q-1975:2Q
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 2 33.67 1974:2Q 1974:1Q-1974:3Q
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 3 46.30 1974:2Q 1974:1Q-1974:3Q
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 4 54.83 1974:4Q 1974:3Q-1975:1Q
1957:2Q-1980:3Q 5 81.36 1975:1Q 1974:4Q-1975:2Q
Panel B: 2nd subsample
Sample Period VAR Sup-Wald Break Date 90% Conﬁdence Interval
1980:4Q-2001:1Q 1 33.62 1986:3Q 1986:2Q-1986:4Q
1980:4Q-2001:1Q 2 52.75 1985:4Q 1985:3Q-1986:1Q
1980:4Q-2001:1Q 3 90.64 1986:1Q 1985:4Q-1986:2Q
1980:4Q-2001:1Q 4 128.04 1986:2Q 1986:1Q-1986:3Q
1980:4Q-2001:1Q 5 174.00 1987:01Q 1986:4Q-1987:2Q
Panel A lists the Sup-Wald values of the break date test derived by Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998)
applied to a VAR(3) of the ﬁrst subsample residuals implied by the vector autoregression of CPI inﬂation,
the output gap and the Federal funds rate. Panel B lists the values associated with the analogous exercise
for the second subsample.
36Table 4: FIML estimates
CPI GDP Deﬂ.
1st P. 2nd P. 2nd P.-gap 2nd P. 1st P. 2nd P.-gap
δ 0.5482 0.6275 0.7266 0.5377 0.5595 0.5989
(0.0182) (0.0317) (0.0269) (0.0151) (0.0174) (0.515)
λ 0.0072 0.0009 0.0010 0.0013 0.0008 0.0005
(0.0052) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0009) (0.0006)
µ 0.5180 0.4899 0.4959 0.5007 0.4820 0.4907
(0.0213) (0.0256) (0.0253) (0.0220) (0.0344) (0.0313)
φ 0.0146 0.0044 0.0022 0.0098 0.0064 0.0031
(0.0126) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0049)
ρ 0.7740 0.8759 0.8921 0.8395 0.8480 0.8703
(0.0509) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0212) (0.0401) (0.0366)
β 0.9825 1.7716 1.6027 0.8279 1.6445 1.3792
(0.1400) (0.5265) (1.2237) (0.2080) (0.4497) (0.7661)
γ 0.6992 0.6117 0.5877 1.1827 0.5720 0.5877
(0.2448) (0.3358) (0.3305) (0.1389) (0.2791) (0.2693))
σAS 1.2034 0.9967 1.0307 0.7880 0.4603 0.4610
(0.0984) (0.0932) (0.1109) (0.0603) (0.0389) (0.0421)
σIS 0.7149 0.3831 0.3581 0.5878 0.3877 0.3608
(0.0566) (0.0320) (0.0315) (0.0457) (0.0356) (0.331)
σMP 0.7551 0.7159 0.6081 0.8239 0.7226 0.6079
(0.0559) (0.0557) (0.0483) (0.0585) (0.0549) (0.0488)
This Table shows the FIML parameter estimates of the structural New-Keynesian macro model with
CPI and GDPD inﬂation, respectively. Output is detrended quadratically and the Federal funds rate
is used as interest rate. The subsample associated with 1st P. spans the period 1957:2Q-1980:3Q, 2nd
P. spans the period 1980:4Q-2001:1Q and 2nd P.-gap spans 1981:4Q-2001:1Q. The model’s equations in
demeaned form are:
πt = δEtπt+1 + (1 − δ)πt−1 + λyt + ASt
yt = µEtyt+1 + (1 − µ)yt−1 − φ(rt − Etπt+1) + IS,t
rt = ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[βEtπt+1 + γyt] + MPt
37Table 5: Structural Parameters in the AS and IS equations
CPI GDP Deﬂ.
1st P. 2nd P. 1st P. 2nd P.
ϑ 0.8242 0.5934 0.8598 0.7873
(0.0332) (0.0505) (0.0281) (0.0310)
ϕ 0.9150 0.9699 0.9645 0.9717
(0.3900) (0.6668) (0.7566) (0.5155)
σ 35.4795 111.34 51.0918 75.3125
(30.6540) (106.4391) (27.2027) (71.4929)
h 0.9575 1.0507 1.0171 1.0892
(0.0862) (0.1085) (0.0910) (0.1482)
This Table shows the structural parameters of the AS and IS equations. Standard errors appear in
parentheses and are computed through the delta-method.
38Table 6: Generalized Eigenvalues: Baseline Speciﬁcations
Panel A: CPI
1st period 2nd period
ξ1 0.7484 0.5935
ξ2 0.8319-0.1245i 0.9129 - 0.0372i












This Table reports, across sample periods, the generalized eigenvalues which determine the stability of
the structural macro model under the two data speciﬁcations.






















This Table shows the Wald-test statistics of parameter instability for the baseline parameters. The
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p). Andrews and Fair (1988), show that it is distributed as a chi-square
with p degrees of freedom under the null of parameter stability.










This Table shows the Wald-test statistics of parameter instability for the structural estimates in the
AS and IS equations. The probability values of no structural change appear in parentheses. The Wald






p). Andrews and Fair (1988), show that it is distributed
as a chi-square with p degrees of freedom under the null of parameter stability.
41Table 9: Standard Deviations
Panel A: CPI
1st period 2nd period
Sample Model Sample Model
σπ 3.78 3.64 2.09 2.05
[2.86 4.70] [2.87 5.41] [1.37 2.81] [1.54 3.44]
σy 2.62 2.28 2.50 2.20
[2.25 2.98] [1.68 4.37] [2.06 2.93] [1.05 4.39]
σr 2.94 2.78 3.18 2.20
[2.12 3.76] [1.70 5.13] [1.94 4.42] [1.59 4.76]
Panel B: GDPD
1st period 2nd period
Sample Model Sample Model
σπ 2.73 2.83 1.81 1.32
[2.16 3.29] [2.06 5.25] [0.92 2.71] [1.01 3.01]
σy 2.62 2.07 2.50 2.16
[2.25 2.98] [1.68 4.37] [2.06 2.93] [1.05 4.39]
σr 2.94 2.78 3.18 2.20
[2.12 3.76] [1.70 5.13] [1.94 4.42] [1.59 4.76]
This Table reports both the sample and model standard deviation across sample periods and data
speciﬁcations. The volatilities’ standard errors appear in brackets. The sample standard errors were ob-
tained through the GMM estimation outlined in the note of Table 1. The empirical standard errors were
computed through the following Montecarlo procedure: We perform random draws from the asymptotic
distribution of the parameter set to construct Ω and Γ matrices of the model’s solution which yields
volatility values for π, y and r. We replicate this exercise 1,000 times discarding the non-stationary
solutions in the process.
42Table 10: Counterfactual Standard Deviations
Panel A: CPI
Model
D1,Φ1 D1,Φ2 D2,Φ1 D2,Φ2
σπ 3.64 2.48 2.98 2.05
[2.87 5.41] [1.88 3.80] [2.44 5.33] [1.54 3.44]
σy 2.28 4.05 1.28 2.20
[1.68 4.37] [1.89 4.96] [1.00 3.44] [1.05 4.39]
σr 2.78 3.14 2.12 2.20
[1.70 5.13] [2.10 5.31] [1.35 4.51] [1.59 4.76]
Panel B: GDPD
Model
D1,Φ1 D1,Φ2 D2,Φ1 D2,Φ2
σπ 2.83 2.25 1.66 1.32
[2.06 5.25] [1.76 4.09] [1.22 4.24] [1.01 3.01]
σy 2.07 3.25 1.39 2.16
[1.50 4.00] [1.47 4.67] [0.98 3.22] [0.94 4.36]
σr 2.66 3.01 1.86 2.09
[1.97 5.07] [1.78 5.10] [1.44 4.36] [1.39 4.95]
This Table reports the VAR(1) and model’s implied standard deviations implied by all the combinations
of volatilities and propagation. The volatilities in column Di,Φj, i = 1,2, j = 1,2, are those associated
with the i−th period structural error standard deviations and the j−th period propagation coeﬃcients.
The corresponding empirical 95% conﬁdence intervals appear in brackets. They were computed through
the Montecarlo procedure outlined in Table 9.
43Table 11: Counterfactuals Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A: CPI
AS,IS Mon. Pol. Std. Dev.
λ φ β1 γ1 β2 γ2 σπ(1,2) σπ(2,1)
0.004 0.010 0.96 0.75 2.01 0.54 2.51 3.02
0.010 0.025 1.02 0.66 2.77 0.59 2.81 3.13
0.010 0.050 1.01 0.83 3.50 1.21 2.75 3.20
Panel B: GDPD
AS,IS Mon. Pol. Std. Dev.
λ φ β1 γ1 β2 γ2 σπ(1,2) σπ(2,1)
0.001 0.008 0.90 1.94 1.67 0.57 2.19 1.80
0.005 0.010 0.90 1.06 1.86 0.47 2.62 1.90
0.010 0.025 0.93 1.06 1.99 0.53 2.68 1.77
This Table reports a robustness analysis of the Table 10 counterfactuals ﬁxing λ and φ across periods
around their estimated values. βi and γi represent the estimates of β and γ in period i. Panel A lists the
analysis with CPI inﬂation and Panel B with the GDPD inﬂation. σπ(i,j) is the volatility of inﬂation
under the shocks of the i − th period and propagation of the j − th period.
44Table 12: Counterfactual Inﬂation Volatilities










Panel B: Contribution of Model’s Volatilities
CPI GDPD
σπ(θ1,σAS
2 ) 3.06 1.66
σπ(θ1,σIS
2 ) 3.56 2.82
σπ(θ1,σMP
2 ) 3.64 2.83
This Table reports the counterfactual inﬂation volatilities which would have arisen under the parameter
estimates of the ﬁrst period together with the second period estimate of an individual parameter or
volatility.
45Table 13: Monetary Policy Rule v/s Private Sector?
1st P. 2nd P. Standard Deviations
λ1 φ1 δ1 β1 γ1 λ2 φ2 δ2 β2 γ2 σπ(1 − 1) σπ(1 − 2) σπ(2 − 1) σπ(2 − 2)
0.007 0.015 0.55 0.98 0.70 0.001 0.004 0.63 1.77 0.60 3.2980 2.9647 2.1924 2.1761
0.004 0.010 0.51 1.07 0.80 0.004 0.010 0.58 1.50 0.69 3.3151 3.0090 2.3721 2.2847
0.010 0.025 0.54 0.83 1.18 0.010 0.025 0.56 1.65 0.57 4.1063 3.4422 3.3857 2.9632
This Table lists counterfactual standard deviations for diﬀerent parameter combinations in the model
under CPI inﬂation. σπ(1 − 2) and σπ(2 − 1) are the counterfactual inﬂation volatilities. They were
constructed as follows: σπ(i − j) is the inﬂation standard deviation computed under the structural
parameters of the AS and IS equations of period i and the monetary policy parameters of period j. The
structural shocks were ﬁxed at the two period average. The model’s equations in demeaned form are:
πt = δEtπt+1 + (1 − δ)πt−1 + λyt + ASt
yt = µEtyt+1 + (1 − µ)yt−1 − φ(rt − Etπt+1) + IS,t
rt = ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[βEtπt+1 + γyt] + MPt
46Table 14: Descriptive Statistics: Inﬂation Components
πg πi πx πm πs πe
σπ−1 3.38 4.08 4.57 10.85 4.85 3.99
σπ−2 2.37 2.33 2.70 6.17 3.62 2.58
ρπ−1 0.72 0.73 0.58 0.79 0.67 0.87
ρπ−2 0.44 0.87 0.53 0.24 0.85 0.82
This Table reports the standard deviations and ﬁrst-order correlations of the inﬂation components across
subsamples. σπ−1 is, for instance, the ﬁrst period inﬂation volatility. πg is the government expenses
component, πi is the investment component, πx the exports, πm the imports, πs structures and πe
equipment and software.






























Figure 1: Inﬂation Series and their Rolling Standard Deviations
The top ﬁgure graphs the historical series of the CPI, PCE and GDPD inﬂation rates from 1957:2Q to
2001:2Q. The bottom panel graphs the corresponding rolling standard deviation of the inﬂation rates.
The rolling standard deviations are constructed using a forward looking 20 quarter window.









Figure 2: Series of Wald Statistics: All parameters break for a VAR(3)
of the time series of the Wald statistics which detects a break in all the parameters of an unconstrained
VAR(3). The variables in the VAR are CPI inﬂation, quadratically detrended output and the Federal



















Figure 3: Sup-Wald robustness test
These two ﬁgures graph the time series of the Wald statistics which detects a break in all the parameters
of an unconstrained VAR(3) of the residuals associated with the vector autoregression of CPI inﬂation,
the output gap and the Federal funds rate. The ﬁrst subsample spans the period 1957:2Q-1980:3Q and
the second subsample covers the period 1980:4Q-2001:2Q. The initial and ﬁnal 15% of the samples are
trimmed.
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Figure 4: Model and Sample Autocorrelation Functions
This ﬁgure graphs the implied model’s autocorrelations (solid thick lines) together with the sample
autocorrelations (dashed lines) using the CPI data speciﬁcation. The 95% conﬁdence intervals lie within
the solid thin lines.
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to the Reduced Form Shocks
This Figure compares the VAR(1) and model’s impulse response functions of the macro variables to a
one standard deviation of the three reduced-form shocks: inﬂation, output gap and interest rate shock.
We report the responses under the CPI speciﬁcation.




















GDPD Inflation vs Priv. Dom. Inv. Inflation









GDPD Inflation vs Exports Inflation











GDPD Inflation vs Imports Inflation
Figure 6: GDPD Inﬂation Series and Its Components
These table graphs the inﬂation components of the GDPD against the GDPD series from 1957:2Q to
2001:2Q. The solid line corresponds to a given component whereas the dotted line is the GDPD.








GDPD Inflation vs Structures Inflation








GDPD Inflation vs Equip. &  Software Inflation
Figure 7: GDPD Inﬂation Series and Components of Private Domestic Investment
These table graphs the inﬂation components of the private domestic investment inﬂation against the
GDPD series from 1957:2Q to 2001:2Q. The solid line corresponds to a given component whereas the
dotted line is the GDPD.
53